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Abstract
This work explores the effects  of production offshoring on the workforce skill  composition of
manufacturing firms.  Its aim is to assess if the firms’  strategy to offshore production activities
determines a bias in the in-house employment of labor in favour of high-skilled workers. Using
three repeated cross-sections of firm-level  data over the period 1995-2003,  we  employ a non-
parametric  analysis  based  on  propensity  score  matching  thanks  to  which  we  can  control  for
selectivity bias without relying on a specific functional form of the relations of interest. We test
the effect of production offshoring on the workforce skill composition of manufacturing firms by
employing  different  measures  of skills  by occupational  title.  Our  results  point  to  a  weak,  but
down-skilling,  impact  of  delocalization  on the  labor  composition  of  Italian  manufacturing:  in
particular, we find that firms that farmed out production activities in 1998-2000 generally employ
a  lower  share  of  skilled,  non  manual,  workers  with  respect  to  the  counterfactual  of  non-
delocalizing firms. These results seem to be in line with an idea of defensive offshoring. However,
despite the usual findings that mainly stress the negative impact of delocalization on low-skilled
workers, we find here that middle-managers category is the most affected. Such evidence may find
a twofold explanation: on the one hand, skilled workers can decline more than unskilled workers
because of a substitution effect that is driven by the will of reducing not only redundant activities,
but  also  intermediate  skills-intensive  activities  as  control  and  coordination  for  which  middle-
managers are employed for. On the other hand, skilled workers may decline in absolute terms,
because of a quantity effect that occurs when firms decide to transfer managerial staff in order to
coordinate and supervise the activities shifted abroad.
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1. Introduction
During the last three decades the way goods are manufactured has dramatically
changed. Next to an extensive use of IT capital, imported materials, intermediate
services and skilled labor, an increasing replacement of low-skill employment is
occurring due to the fact that firms de-locate low-skill intensive activities towards
less  developed,  cheap  labor,  countries.  Trade  flows,  import  competition  and
foreign direct investments (FDI), thus, result in a reorganization of production in
which home firms can specialize on the high-value-added phases of production
while economizing on production costs. 
Traditionally, two main explanations have been given to account for the
shift in demand away from low-skilled workers in industrialized countries. The
first refers to skill-biased labor-saving technological change that, by fostering the
demand for more qualified workers within technologically advanced industries,
tends either to increase the wage inequality in relatively flexible labor markets
(like  in  the  US and in  the  UK) or  to  increase  relative  unemployment  of  less
qualified workers in relatively more rigid labor markets (as in Germany, France,
Denmark and Italy)3.
The  second  claims  for  increased  international  trade  and  globalization,
according to which labor is relocated in a way that determines a shift of activities
involving  unskilled  workers  toward  less-developed  countries,  while  keeping
activities  typically  developed  by  high-skilled  workers  within  industrialized
countries, thus increasing their comparative advantage in the production of high-
skill intensive goods. 
 On  this  field,  neoclassical  trade  theory  asserts  that  increased  import
competition from low-wage countries plays a minor role in explaining the causes
of the deterioration in the economic fortunes of less-skilled workers. According to
the Hecksher-Olin-Samuelson (HOS) model, an increase in the volume of foreign
trade should simultaneously lead to a convergence in wages between the home
and the host country and a widening in the gap between wages of low-skilled and
3 For  a  review  of  theoretical  and  empirical  models  of  skill-biased  technological  change  see
Chennels and Van Reenen (2002), Piva (2004) and Antonietti (2007). 
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high-skilled employees within the home country.  Thus, a decrease in the wage
rate of low-skilled workers should stimulate firms to increase the demand for this
now cheaper factor. However, the observed deterioration in the economic fortunes
of less-skilled workers seems to be at odds with these predictions, so that the help
of empirical analyses is needed. 
In  the last  two decades,  different  attempts  have  been  made in order  to
empirically prove the skill-biased nature of international  fragmentation. On the
one  hand,  some  studies  support  traditional  theories  of  international  trade
concluding that import  competition is not  an important  determinant of relative
wage or employment shares, especially if compared to labor-saving technological
change. On the other hand, however,  some studies argue that increased import
intensity exerts a negative impact on both the employment and the wage share of
less qualified workers.
Finally, a recent strand of industrial economics literature have stressed the
importance that the objectives underlying the decision to offshore production have
in generating occupational effects on the home country’s labor force. Production
delocalization characterized by a  defensive nature, primarily aimed at increasing
the firms’ competitiveness through a labor costs-saving strategy, by shifting away
of routine activities tends to reduce both the employment of production and the
employment  of non-production workers.  When production delocalization is, on
the other  hand,  pushed by the will  to  search  for  new market  opportunities  or
specific competencies not directly available at home, a virtuous cycle in favour of
the employment of highly qualified human resources may occur, based on the fact
that,  when  externalizing  redundant  stages,  the  firm  can  rely  on  its  high-value
added activities and exploit its core competencies. 
Our contribution to the debate moves in two directions. First, we focus on
a sample of manufacturing firms located in Italy, a country that has received little
attention in empirical studies, but that, due to its structural characteristics and to
its  recent  intensive  activity  in  international  delocalization,  represents  an
interesting laboratory for testing the labor market effects of production offshoring.
Second,  we  employ  a  non-parametric  approach,  based  on  propensity  score
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matching, in order to test the skill-bias effect of production offshoring avoiding
any  selectivity  bias  and  without  estimating  specific  functional  forms  of  the
objective functions. 
The article is structured as follow. Section 2 briefly sketches the empirical
literature  developed  around  skill-biased  international  fragmentation.  Section  3
describes data and the empirical methodology adopted in the analysis. Section 4
presents and discusses the main results achieved and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Background literature
The labor market effects of production globalization have often been a ‘hot topic’
for  both  international  trade  and  labor  economists.  According  to  Jones  and
Kierzkowski (2001), international fragmentation can be thought as a process of
splitting  up  and  spread  of  previously  integrated  stages  of  production  over  an
international network of production sites. More specifically, production offshoring
refers  to  the  de-localization  of  manufacturing  activities  towards  a  low-cost
country or region. To the extent that this practice determines a reorganization of
the production process, it  implies a labor recomposition within offshoring firms, 
This  paper  basically  links  two  strands  of  empirical  literature:  works
looking  at  the  determinants  of  the  firms’  offshoring  decision  and  works
investigating  the  effects  of  such  a  decision  on  the  labor  composition  of  the
manufacturing firms. 
With respect to the determinants, standard theory and evidence generally
suggest two factors as responsible for the choice to re-locate production outside
the firm’s boundaries (Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Grossman and Helpman, 2002;
Antràs and Helpman, 2004; Girma and Görg, 2004). The most important refers to
the possibility to save on labor costs, that is, to cut wage and benefit costs for non-
core employees by farming out peripheral stages of production towards low-wage
countries.  On this purpose,  high-wage firms are  typically expected  to offshore
production more intensively than low-wage firms. 
A second factor is the search for specialized skills and equipment that the
firm lacks at home. What is relevant here is the presence of scale economies in the
4
provision of  the production or service in question. In  fact,  there may be scale
economies  in  the  production  of  specific  inputs  and,  in  this  sense,  firm  size
becomes a determinant of its delocation strategy: since small and medium firms
usually have more difficulties to reap the minimum efficient scale, they are more
willing to externalize production. However, as small firms are less flexible than
large  firms  in  adapting  to  consumers  demand  variability,  or  as  they can  face
higher search costs, a positive relationship may also emerge between firm size and
offshoring. 
In addition, next to labor cost savings and the seek for economies of scale,
other factors may contribute to affect firm’s decision to farm out production. Görg
and Hanley (2004), for instance, point that export propensity may have a positive
effect on production offshoring: the more a firm exports, the more the possibilities
to find foreign low wage suppliers. Technology also can represent an important
determinant (Tomiura, 2004; Bartel, Lach and Sicherman, 2005): in particular, a
positive  relation  can  be  thought  between  offshoring  and  an  intensive  use  of
computers at the workplace, a high R&D intensity,  or the presence of a highly
skilled  workforce  within  domestic  firms.  In  addition,  firms  closer  to  the
technological  frontier  are  supposed  to  be  more  willing  to  decentralize  their
activities in order  to deal  with information not directly available in the public
history (Acemoglu et al., 2006). 
 With respect to the labor market effects, industrial organization literature
have emphasized the importance of considering the strategic reasons underlying
the firms’ decision to offshore production. If offshoring is primarily driven by the
seek for new markets  and new competencies,  the impact on the home country
employment may be neutral or even positive, especially for high-skilled workers.
If,  on the other side,  offshoring is  driven by a ‘defensive’  behaviour aimed at
increasing the firm’s price competitiveness by cutting production costs, then the
impact  on  home  employment  may  be  negative,  in  particular  for  low-skilled
workers.  
The evidence available from international trade literature, however, does
not seem to depict a clear-cut framework. A first class of empirical studies is in
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line with HOS predictions in not finding a clear  positive relationship between
offshoring, declined as import competition, and the rise in the demand for skilled
relative to unskilled labor, whereas a second, relatively more recent, class does
find,  in particular,  a significant and negative impact  of  import  competition,  or
international  outsourcing,  on  the  relative  employment  and  wages  of  unskilled
workers in industrialized countries. 
Within the former group, the general emerging result is that technological
change, rather than increased import competition, is the major responsible of the
declining economic fortunes of low-skilled workers. The first set of contributions
on this  field  develops around the  late  1970s,  and,  looking at  the US and UK
product  and labor  markets,  generally finds  that  import  competition is  a  minor
factor in explaining labor displacement if compared to other structural  changes
(Cable, 1977; Krueger, 1980a, 1980b). On the same line, even if decomposing the
separate effects on employment and wages, Grossman (1987) finds that import
competition is  responsible for  the loss  of  a  large  number  of  jobs  only in  one
industry over nine, and for the decline in wages only in two industries. 
During  the  1990s,  other  studies  improve  the  measurement  of  import
competition and compare this variable with proxies of technological change, but
still provide a weak evidence on the trade-skill complementarity hypothesis. For
the US, Freeman and Katz (1991) find, on the one side, a significant effect  of
import competition on the employment composition in the steel industry over the
period between 1976 and 1983, but, on the other, they find a small correlation
between volumes of imports and changes in real wages. Katz and Murphy (1992),
using  individual  and  labor  market  data  between  1963  and  1987,  find  that
outsourcing,  i.e.  shifts  of  portions  of  industry  production  outside  the  United
States, is not an important determinant of relative wage changes. Lawrence and
Slaughter (1993), looking at the effects of trade on the US average performance
and  wages in the 1980s, do not find support for the idea that import competition
places downward pressure of relative wages of unskilled workers. On the same
line are Berman  et  al.  (1994),  who, estimating trans-logarithmic labor demand
equations, obtain only a small employment effect of increased import competition
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with  respect  to  production-labor-saving  technological  change.  More  recently,
Slaughter (2000) analyzes 32 US manufacturing industries in the 1980s and does
not show clear results in favour of the positive relationship between FDI and the
employment  of  skilled  workers  at  home.  Finally,  Morrison-Paul  and  Siegel
(2001), using a dynamic cost function framework, find that technological change
still  exerts the largest  effects on changes in domestic labor composition, while
international  trade,  by stimulating the adoption of computers at the workplace,
tends only to augment the skill-bias effect of technology. 
Evidence  against  the  skill-bias  effects  of  import  competition  and
outsourcing  comes  also  from studies  on  European  countries.  For  the  UK,  for
instance,  Görg  et  al. (2001),  focusing  on  the  increasing  trade  in  intermediate
goods in the 1982-1996 period, find weak or no evidence of a positive relationship
between  outsourcing  and  wage  inequality.  For  Germany,  Fitzenberger  (1999)
leaves a dominant role for technology in shifting unskilled employment  away,
while Falk and Koebel (2000), estimating a Box-Cox cost function, provide no
evidence for skill-bias service outsourcing,  even if they recognize a significant
substitution effect between high-skilled labor and intermediate services. Finally, a
low significant impact of FDI on the skill employment ratio is found by Piva and
Vivarelli (2004) for the case of Italian manufacturing firms in the 1990s, even if
the nature of the data do not allow the a priori exclusion of a possible interaction. 
Contrary to this strand of literature,  another set of contributions provide
general  support  for  the  skill-biased  nature  of  international  trade.  For  the  US,
Revenga (1992) analyzes import price data on a panel of manufacturing industries
and finds that the dollar appreciation occurred during the 1980s is at the basis of
the significant and sizable negative effect  of increased import  competition and
both employment and wages,  even if results concern between industries, rather
than within industries, effects.  Wood (1994), in addition, finds a general skill-
biased  impact  of  international  trade  and  calculates  that  import  competition
determines a reduction in the demand for unskilled labor by 30% in 1990. On the
same  line  are  Sachs  and  Shatz  (1994),  who  conclude  that  production
internationalization exerts a double effect on overall labor composition: it is not
7
only  the  cause  of  a  general  decrease  in  manufacturing  but,  together  with
technological change, is a determinant of the decline in the relative demand for
low-skilled workers.  Moreover, Feenstra and Hanson (1996) give some evidence
that, for the period 1972-1990, international outsourcing is responsible of a 30%
to 50% rise in the demand for skilled workers,  and, thus, for a rise in income
inequality. 
For the UK, Anderton and Brenton (1999) estimate that, between 1970 and
1986, imports from low-wage countries determine a negative impact of about 40%
on  the  wage-bill  share  and  relative  employment  of  low-skilled  workers.  This
result is further reinforced by Hijzen et al. (2004), who show that, between 1982
and 1996, international outsourcing has a strong negative impact on the demand
for semi-skilled and unskilled labor.
For France, Strauss-Khan (2003), using input-output tables and labor data,
finds that the highly increasing vertical specialization, i.e. the share of imported
inputs in production, is the main determinant of the sharp decline in the share of
unskilled workers between 1977 and 1993, passed from -15% in the period 1977-
85 to -25% between 1985 and 1993. 
Finally,  a  mixed  picture  emerges  from  other  studies  that  control  for
different  measures  of  import  competition  and  compare  different  countries.
Looking at Japanese manufacturing firms, for instance, Head and Ries (2002) find
that a positive relationship between outsourcing and the employment of skilled
labor holds only if the former turns towards developing countries. For Austria,
instead, a positive and significant effect on skills comes out only for proxies of
international trade like export openness and outsourcing, while a negative effect
arises  when  considering  import  penetration  (Dell’mour  et  al.,  2000).  Finally,
Helg  and  Tajoli  (2005)  compare  the  effect  of  international  fragmentation  of
production on the skill ratio in Italy and in Germany and show that a positive and
significant impact emerges  only for  the former,  while for  the latter a negative
effect seems to prevail. 
Concluding,  the  most  recent  literature  on  skill-bias  international
fragmentation  of  production  seems  to  generally  stress  the  negative  impact  of
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production offshoring on the employment and pay of unskilled relative to skilled
workers.  However,  what also emerges is that country specific effects,  different
econometric  techniques  and  different  measurements,  of  both  international
fragmentation  and  labor  skills,  as  well  as  different  time  periods  matter  in
explaining such a variety of effects. 
In this respect, Kohler (2001) and Egger and Egger (2001) summarize the
ambiguity with the idea that the income and employment effects of international
fragmentation depend on the factor intensity assumptions for the outsourced and
non-outsourced  production  phase  together  with  the  skill  intensity  of  the
outsourcing  industry.  Foreign  investments  in  low-income  countries,  relatively
abundant  of  unskilled  workers,  should  consist  in  the  move away of  low-skill
intensive stages of production, thus causing a skill upgrading within high-income
countries.  On  the  other  hand,  a  skill  downgrading  process  should  emerge  if
production delocalization involves investments in high-income countries, that are
supposed to be relatively abundant of high-skilled labor.
Whether  international  delocalization  is  a  sufficiently  large  phenomenon  in
order  to  account  for  any  economically  significant  labor  market  effects  is,
therefore, an empirical matter. 
3. Methodology and data
Empirical works testing for the skill-biased international trade are generally based
on  the  estimation  of  labour  demand  equations,  typically  in  a  transcendental
logarithmic form (Berman  et  al.,  1994).  However useful,  this approach suffers
some limitations.  First  of all,  it  relies on a simple cost  or production function
framework, which is subject to a set of  ad hoc restrictions in order to assure its
tractability:  optimization  restrictions  (Christensen  et  al.,  1973),  homogeneity
assumptions (Morrison-Paul and Siegel, 2001) and the specific parametric form
that  constraints  the  parameters  to  assume  specific  values.  Second,  limited
information is usually provided on labour composition and firms characteristics,
these latter being particularly important if one believes that firms endogenously
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choose to invest abroad by looking at previous experience and at the composition
of  its  internal  assets.  Thus,  a  possible  problem  of  self-selection  may  arise,
according to which the set of firms which decide to transfer  production stages
abroad cannot be thought as a randomly drawn sample. 
3.1. The evaluation problem and the Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
Our main empirical contribution to the debate is to bypass the issues above by
employing  a non-parametric  approach  based on PSM (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983) developed within the evaluation literature in a context of observational data
(Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996; Heckman, 1990, 1997; Heckman, Hichimura
and Todd, 1997; Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999; Sianesi, 2004; Wooldridge
2001; Smith and Todd, 2005). On this purpose, PSM is a more flexible technique
with respect to standard labour demand estimation, because it does not force the
imposition of a parametric specification and it allows to handle the selection bias
along with the problem of  (time-invariant)  unobserved  heterogeneity when the
outcome variable  is  appropriately  constructed  by exploiting the repeated  cross
section structure of the data. 
In what follows we make explicit at first the evaluation problem and then
the assumptions on which the PSM relies on. 
The evaluation refers to a process aiming to assess (or infer) the effect of a
treatment administered to a subset of individuals (participants) within a population
on an outcome variable.  Ideally  such  effect  ought  to  be  found comparing the
outcomes of the same individuals in the case they receive the treatment and in the
case they do not receive the treatment4. However, the latter it is obviously not a
viable  option:  individuals  cannot  be  simultaneously  participants  and  not
participants, they are in one state or another at a point in time. For such a reason
the evaluation problem is essentially a missing data problem. 
In order to describe a general formulation of the parameter of interest in
this work let assume we have a binary treatment variable so that we can denote
treated individuals by D=1 and not treated by D=0. Associated with the two states
4 In the work we use participation (participant) and treatment (treated) as synonymous throughout.
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we have two outcomes: Y 1  and Y 0 .
The effect of interest is the gain from treatment: 
=Y 1Y 0 .
One specific  definition of  such a gain,  which is  the main parameter  of
interest in a wide part of the evaluation literature, is the Average Treatment Effect
on the Treated (ATT):
ATT =E ∣X , D=1=E Y 1Y 0∣X , D=1=E Y 1∣X , D=1E Y 0∣X , D=1
where X is a vector of observed conditioning variables. What we lack in order to
directly compute the ATT is the counterfactual outcome  0( | , 1)E Y X D = : that
associated to the state D=0 for treated individuals, which are obviously in the state
D=1. Within non experimental, or observational, frameworks we need to find a
proxy  of  the  mean  counterfactual  (Smith  and  Todd,  2005).  The  difference
between the proxy and the ideal mean counterfactual represents the selection bias
or  evaluation  bias  that  “arises  because  participants  and  non  participants  are
selected  groups  that  would  have  different  outcomes,  even  in  absence  of  the
[treatment]” (Caliendo and Hujer 2005, p. 4).
As stated above, we decide to implement the PSM to solve the problem of
the missing counterfactual. The rationale for PSM implementation is grounded on
the plausibility of the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), which is an
identification assumption, that can be formalized as follows5 (Heckman, Ichimura,
Todd 1997, 1998; Smith and Todd 2005):
E Y 0∣X , D=1=E Y 0∣D=0=E Y 0∣X  (A1)  
Moreover, the computation of the ATT through the PSM needs the validity of the
assumption that a positive probability of participating (D=1) exists:
5 For a more restrictive condition when the parameter of interest is not the ATT see Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983). 
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 pr D=1∣X 1 (A2)
where  ( 1| )pr D X=  is  the propensity score,  that  is  the probability  of being a
treated individual given a certain vector X of exogenous characteristics. Roughly
speaking,  A1  means  that  the  available  variables  are  all  those  on  which  the
decision of  participating is  based on or,  put  it  another  way,  that  there are not
unobservable variables that influence the participation decision. A2, instead, is a
condition that guarantees the existence of a non participant analogue of the treated
individuals, so that we need to have a counterfactual individual for each treated
individual (Smith and Todd 2005; Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 1998). If
A2 is not verified, then the support of participant is not equal to that of controls:
the support of X does not overlap6 for treated and non treated. In such a case as
Heckman,  Ichimura  and  Todd  (1997),  Heckman,  Ichimura,  Smith  and  Todd
(1998) and Dejha and Waba (1999) put forth the estimation of the ATT must be
conducted  over  the  common  support  region,  discarding  observations  that  lie
outside the common support,  and the “estimated treatment effect  must then be
redefined  as  the  treatment  impact  for  the  […]  participants  whose  propensity
scores lie within the common support region” (Smith and Todd 2005, p.313).
The use of propensity score as a device to find appropriate matches for treated
individuals was introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), who demonstrated
that  if  CIA  holds  then  the  PSM  gives  unbiased  estimate  of  the  ATT.  The
construction of a counterfactual sample7 of non treated individuals that share the
same  pre-treatment  characteristics  of  the  treated  individuals  comparing  each
observed variable of the vector X (i.e. multivariate matching) represents a data-
hungry process if the characteristics on which the counterfactual is constructed are
in a large number. In order to solve the high dimensionality problem Rosenbaum
and  Rubin  (1983)  proposed  to  utilize  the  propensity  score  to  reduce  the
multidimensional  matching  to  a  one  dimensional  procedure.  If  the  propensity
6 In the microeconometric evaluation literature A2 is often called overlapping assumption. 
7 Rubin (1979) demonstrates that in order to reduce the selection bias as much as possible it is
necessary to have a large reservoir from which select the counterfactual sample. The larger is the
reservoir the greater is the reduction in bias obtainable through the matching.
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score satisfies the balancing property, about that we give more details below, then
we can condition on it instead of the vector X and A1 becomes (Smith and Todd
2005):
E Y 0∣pr  X  , D=1=E Y 0∣pr X  , D=0=E Y 0∣pr X  (A1I)
            
When using the PSM the estimated ATT may be affected by a bias due to
unobserved heterogeneity. If unobservable variables exist and they influence the
participation decision  or  the  outcome then  the  CIA assumption does  not  hold
anymore.  One  approach  to  handle  the  problem  of  unobserved  heterogeneity
consists in combining the Difference-In-Differences (DID henceforth) estimator
with the PSM. The mix of the two estimators can help in reducing the bias due to
unobservable time invariant individual characteristics (Blundell and Costa Dias
2004; Smith and Todd 2005; Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd 1998)8. The
implementation of the DID estimator is subjected to the availability of data in a
longitudinal or repeated cross-section format. 
3.2. Implementation
Operationally,  the  Difference-In-Differences-Propensity  Score  Matching
(DID-PSM henceforth) approach we implement in this work consists in a two step
procedure.  For  our  purpose,  we  estimate,  at  first,  the  probability  of  being  a
delocalizing  firm  (the  propensity  score)  conditional  on  the  vector  of  firm
characteristics  X.  These  variables  are  supposed  not  only  to  affect  the  firm’s
decision to offshore production, but also to have an influence on the dependent
variable, i.e. the skill composition of the labor-force. In this respect, we consider a
set of controls on firm’s geographical location, sector9 of economic activity, size,
8 However useful the DID-PSM procedure is not formulated to specifically solve the problem of
unobserved  heterogeneity.  The  existence  of  heterogeneity  not  observed  by the  researcher  that
invalidate the CIA assumption is one of the dominant issues in the recent evaluation literature. In
order  to  test  how sensible  is  the  estimated  ATT with  matching  procedure  to  the  presence  of
unobserved heterogeneity  a  sensitivity  analysis  is  recommended.  Here is  a list  of some recent
contributions  on  this  issue:  DiPrete  and  Gangl  (2004);  Ichino,  Mealli  and  Nannicini  (2006);
Nannicini (2007); Caliendo and Becker (2007).
9 We use the Pavitt taxonomy instead of a standard ATECO classification of economic sectors in
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age, the possibility to be a member of a group of firms and the possibility to have
broken up in sub-units. Since the delocalization decision could have been taken in
each one of the years belonging to the triennium 1998-2000, we believe that also
firm  characteristics  collected  on  such  a  triennium  might  have  influenced  the
decision to offshore production as well10. Following standard empirical literature
on  international  fragmentation,  we  also  included  variables  capturing  firm’s
international activity - represented by a FDI dummy -  firm’s technology - given
by a R&D dummy - labor cost per employee, firm’s average productivity and the
capital  intensity  of  the  production  process,  these  latter  approximating  the
complexity of the production process. Finally we included a variable of financial
profitability  represented  by  returns  on  investments  (for  a  description  of  the
variables see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
At the second stage, we use the propensity score obtained to estimate the
ATT. In our case the outcome variables are the DID in levels of the skill ratios of
the workforce and the DID in levels of employees decomposed in occupational
categories (managers, middle managers, clerks and manual workers, see Table A2
in the Appendix) 
In the first stage, the estimation of the probabilities is conducted by means
of a probit specification, which gives as coefficients the estimated probabilities of
cross-border delocalization. The fitted values of the binary model are then used in
order to correctly align the units on their common characteristics and the mean
comparison  in  the  second  stage  is  performed  on  the  counterfactual  units  so
aligned, that is on the units lying over the common support. 
Since  we  adopt  a  probit  specification,  the  propensity  score  can  be  written  as
follows:
P i=Pr Deloc19982000=1∣X i=  X i ,199597 ;19982000
order to avoid the possibility of perfect identification of the sample during the estimation. 
10 LR test confirms that, not including variables in the latter period would bring to a joint non-
significance of all the covariates. 
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where X is the vector of pre-treatment (and contemporaneous to treatment)
observed variables that, in line with the literature, we consider as determinants of
delocalization (and possibly influencing also the outcome variables), an   is
the  standard  normal  cumulative  distribution  function.  Thus,  the  estimated
probability  P i is the propensity score for each firm. 
At this stage, a first issue we need to address is the balancing property of
the  propensity  score11.  In  order  to  test  for  it,  we  implement  the  procedure
developed  by  Becker  and  Ichino  (2002),  according to  which,  if  the balancing
property is satisfied, than exposure to treatment is random, so that the decision of
delocalization becomes random as well12.
In the second stage of the estimation we apply the DID-PSM. In order to
implement it we need to choose the algorithm to be used in the construction of the
weights  ( , )W i j , where  i and  j  identifies respectively a treated and non treated
firm,  that  are necessary to assign to the counterfactual  firms in computing the
ATT (Caliendo,  Hujer  and  Thomsen,  2005).  The  specific  construction  of  the
weights depend on the propensity score and on the kind of matching (algorithm)
used (nearest neighbour, kernel, radius, and so on).
We decide to implement the nearest neighbour (NN from now on) algorithm with
two  specifications.  Since  NN  matching  pairs  each  treated  firm  to  one
counterfactual firm, the closest neighbour of the treated unit, it likely minimizes
the bias at the expenses of the efficiency.  Usually a trade-off between variance
and bias arises when applying one or the other of the available algorithms for the
matching estimation. In our case, in order to reduce the loss in efficiency that NN
bears on we also use an oversampling version of the NN. In so doing we allow the
11 It must be noted that there is no agreement in the literature about the choice of the observed
variables to be introduced in the binary model. On the one hand in order to have the counterfactual
units  as similar  as possible to the treated ones we should use  all  the observed variable at our
disposal:  the  more  are  the  firms  characteristics  on  which  we  condition  the  probability  of
participation the more precise will be the matching between treated and counterfactual units. On
the other hand, this way of proceeding has a drawback because the more observed variables are
included in the specification the more difficult will be to find a common support and it can also
increase the variance of the estimates (Rubin and Thomas 1996;  Caliendo, Hujer and Thomsen
2005).
12 See  Becker  and  Ichino  (2002)  for  a  detailed  description  of  the  procedure  for  testing  the
balancing property.
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comparison of each treated unit to more than a single closest counterfactual unit
(Smith, Todd 2005; Caliendo, Hujer, Thomsen 2005). 
Finally, the ATT is then computed in the following way:
ATT = 1
N t
∑i=1
N t
Y i
t∑ j=1
N t W i , j Y jc 
where Nt is the number of delocalizing firms. Operationally the standard errors of
the ATT are generated by bootstrapping.
In  conclusion,  the  main  aim  of  the  DID-PSM  score  matching  method  is  to
generate a set of non delocalizing firms, among all those that do not delocalize, as
more as similar to the delocalizing firms in order to get a “proxy” of what would
have happened to domestic skill composition in actually delocalizing firms they
had not chosen to displaced activities outside national borders. Thus, to gather an
estimate of the skill-biased nature of international fragmentation, once we obtain
adequate control  groups for  firms offshoring production to less developed-low
labour cost countries, we compare their pattern of skilled labour employment with
the one of the actually delocalizing firms. 
3.3. Hypotheses
We formulate and test two hypotheses about the effects of production offshoring
on the skill intensity of manufacturing firms in Italy. 
H1. Production offshoring alters the scale of activity of home firms, thus exerting
a negative impact on employment. If this is the case, it can generate either (H1.1)
a skill-biased effect by decreasing more the share of unskilled  relative to skilled
workers, or (H1.2) a skill downgrading pattern by decreasing more the share of
skilled workers per unit of unskilled workers. 
H2. Production offshoring consists  in  the mere replication of  all,  or  part,   of
domestic activities. In this case the effect on the skill composition can be neutral,
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if the scale of activity of home firms does not change, or negative if we suppose
that domestic firms transfer part of their managerial skills to foreign sites. 
Hypothesis H1 may reflect two possible scenarios that can characterize the
strategy  of   internationalization  of  manufacturing  firms.  Since  the  question
formulated in the questionnaire is “Has the firm delocalized its own productions
in Centre-East European countries […] in the triennium 1998-2000?”, it is likely
the  case  that  offshoring  firms  in  our  sample  have  adopted  such  a  strategic
behaviour  in  order  to  merely  reduce  labour  costs  and  improve  their  price
competitiveness. Italian firms, which seems to base their competition on strategic
reduction  of  production  costs  (Capitalia,  2001), may  find  an  opportunity  of
persevering  in  a  low-profile  strategic  behaviour  by  delocalizing  part  of  their
production in markets where manual workers are paid less than in the domestic
labour  market.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  the  likely effect  should  be  an  overall
reduction in the domestic employment, even if the source of such a decrease can
be twofold: (i) a higher reduction in the share of production workers (blue-collars)
relative to non-production (white-collars), but also (ii) a possible higher reduction
in the relative share of non-production workers with respect to the reduction in the
share of production workers. 
Hypothesis H2, instead, reflects the possibility that production offshoring may be
a  horizontal  investment,  that  can  either  reduce  the scale  of  domestic  activity-
because  of  a  relocation  of  redundant  processes  –  or  leave  it  unaltered  if  we
suppose that foreign activities are independent from domestic ones. 
3.4. Data 
We test these predictions on a sample of Italian manufacturing firms taken
from the last  three waves (VII,  VIII  and IX)  of the Survey on Manufacturing
Firms  (Indagine  sulle  Imprese  Manifatturiere)  conducted  by  Capitalia  (ex
Mediocredito Centrale) and covering the period 1995-2003. For the three surveys,
interviews  have been  respectively conducted in  1998,  2001 and 2004 over  all
firms with more than 500 employees and over a representative sample of firms
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with more than 11 and less than 500 employees, stratified by geographical area,
sector  of  economic activity and size.  In  our  analysis  we use a  panel  of  firms
appearing in all three waves, 1995-97, 1998-2000 and 2001-03. Each of the three
waves gather information on 4.497, 4.680 and 4.289 firms respectively, while the
number of firms we obtain from merging the three cross-sections is 414 that, after
further cleaning (for our purposed estimation), decreases to 330.
As it can be noted in the Table 1 below, the majority of the firms in our
restricted  sample  is  constituted  by  small  and  medium  small  firms  (74,5%).
Supplier dominated and specialized suppliers firms represent the only sectors out
of  four  having experienced  production offshoring13,  so  that  firms belonging to
scale intensive and science based sectors have been ex ante eliminated in order to
avoid the generation of bad matches14. 
Table 1. Sample structure by economic sector and employment size
Size Supplier Dominated Specialized Suppliers Total
11-20 30 11 41
21-50 68 52 120
51-250 72 54 126
251-500 15 10 25
501+ 9 9 18
Total 194 136 330
Source: authors elaborations from the Capitalia sample, 1995-2003.
Table 2 shows that only 18 (about 5%) of the 330 firms have chosen to
offshore  production.  Such  a  figure,  however,  overestimates  the  percentage  of
offshoring firms in the complete Capitalia sample coming from the VIII wave of
the Survey on Manufacturing Firms,  which is  equal  to the 1.9% of the entire
sample  (Capitalia,  2001).  Another  important  aspects  that  should be stressed  is
that, differently from to the original 1998-2000 cross-section – in which the share
of offshoring firms progresses along with their employment size -  in our merged
sample small and medium firms show a higher propensity to delocalize than large
13 This is in line with Capitalia (2001) and Fortis (2005), who find that the most involved sectors
in offshoring practices are textile and clothing, leather and shoes and machinery. 
14 We  replicated  the  same  estimations  for  the  whole  matched  sample  of  414  firms  without
reaching different outcomes. 
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firms.  Even if this can represent a bias of representativeness, it should be noted
that our sample cleaning allows us to replicate a quasi-experiment in which we
‘isolate’ only firms that are present in each time span, located in the most active
environments (sectors) with respect to the ‘treatment’ of interest, i.e. offshoring,
and  maintaining  the  general  employment  size  distribution  with  respect  to  the
original cross-sections.  
Table 2. Offshoring by sector of economic activity and employment size
Offshoring Num. Obs. Frequency
No 314 95.15
Yes 16 4.85
Total 330 100.00
Offshoring Sectors of economic activity (Pavitt classification) Total
Supplier Dominated Specialized Suppliers
No 185 129 314
Yes 9 7 16
Total 194 136 330
Offshoring Employment size
11-20 21-50 51-250 251-500 501+ Total
No 39 114 122 22 17 314
Yes 2
(4.88%)
6
(5%)
4
(3.17%)
3 (12%)
1
(5.56%)
16
Total 41 120 126 25 18 330
Source: authors elaborations from the Capitalia sample, 1995-2003.
4. Estimation and results
Some first interesting observations can be drawn by looking at the trend of the
variables used to construct the outcomes of the DID-PSM, for delocalizing and
non  delocalizing  firms,  along  the  time  span  1995-2003.  Figures  1A-2A  in
Appendix  show the trends  of  the employment  composition by skill  ratios  and
occupational categories for firms on the common support. As far as the skill ratios
are concerned, the ratio between non-manual and manual workers does not show
any relevant difference in the trend along the time span considered (1995-2003). 
When we shift the attention to less aggregate indicators of skill ratio, using
the decomposition of occupational categories for non-manual workers (managers,
mid-managers  and  clerks),  the  evidence  about  the  trends  becomes  more
heterogeneous and not easily interpretable. A quite sharp decline is shown by the
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ratio of middle-mangers on manuals and middle-managers on clerks plus manuals
after  the  triennium of  delocalization  for  offshoring  firms.  The  same  variables
evidence also an increasing trend in the period just before the triennium in which
offshoring took place. On the contrary the skill ratios of non delocalizing firms
put in evidence a smother trend over the entire time span15. 
Looking at the trend of occupational categories the framework seems quite
clear:  while clerks and manuals do not show relevant  alteration in their trends
before and after the delocalization, managers and middle-managers appear to have
quite abrupt shifts. The first impression leads us to expect some significant impact
of  offshoring  on  skill  ratios  and  occupational  trends  involving  managers  and
middle-managers, in line with hypothesis H1.
Before proceeding with the comments of the main results of DID-PSM it is
convenient to spend some words on the determination of the propensity score and
the presence of firms on common support. As stated above the procedure adopted
to test  for  the balancing property of the propensity score is  that  developed by
Becker  and Ichino  (2002).  After  having  estimated  the  probability  of  being  an
offshoring firm the steps are the following (Tab.A3.1-A3.3): “split the sample in k
equally spaced intervals of the propensity score  […];  within each interval test
that the average propensity score of treated and control units do not differ; if the
test fails in one interval, split the interval in halves and test again [and] continue
until, in all intervals, the average propensity score of treated and control units do
not differ; within each interval, test that the means of each characteristic do not
differ between treated and control units” (Becker and Ichino, 2002, p.3). 
If the balancing hypothesis was not satisfied then the researcher ought to find a
new  and  less  parsimonious  specification  of  the  binary  model.  The  balancing
property in our case is satisfied16.
As far as the distribution of the firms on the common support is concerned,
Fig.A3 and Tab.A3.3 show that two delocalizing firms are not on the overlapping
15 To this results contributes quite heavily the number of firms in the two groups on the common
support: 16 at maximum for delocalizing firms; 104 for non delocalizing firms. 
16 The output of the Becker and Ichino (2002) module is not fully reported but it is available upon
request. 
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support. This means that in the matching estimation two treated units don not have
appropriate  counterfactual  units  and  they  cannot  enter  in  the  comparison
procedure.  The information of  such units  is  lost.  Discarding  two delocalizing 
firms out of sixteen it might conduce to misleading interpretations, thus, among
other things, we have to be careful in interpreting our results.
Tables 3 to 5 presents the main results achieved from the propensity score
matching estimation. The outcome from the first stage is, instead, listed in the
Appendix (Tables A3.1, A3.2 and A3.3). 
In order to account for the heterogeneous composition of the labor force,
we define different skill variables and we estimate the impact of our ‘treatment’,
i.e. offshoring, on their variation over time. We first start with the most aggregate
indicator, that is the ratio between non-manual and manual workers, the former
including  high  skilled  occupations  as  managers,  middle  managers  and  clerks,
while the latter comprising low-skilled occupations as operatives (blue-collars). 
Both  nearest  neighbour  propensity  score  with  oversampling  and  with
replacement show that the effect of production offshoring on the ATT is always
negative but not significantly different from zero. This means that firms choosing
to externalize production do not seem to face any particular aggregate skill  re-
composition dynamics over the sample period. 
In order to shed more light on this weak result, we further disaggregate the
previous variable in order to analyze the dynamics of each single skill category
for the treated and the untreated observations. On this purpose, we identify other
four skill variables, whose difference-in-differences constructions are reported in
Tab.A.2: managers and middle managers over blue-collars; middle managers over
blue-collars; managers and middle managers over clerks and blue-collars; middle-
managers over clerks and blue-collars.
Table 3 shows again results for the first two of these new variables.  In
particular,  when  looking  at  the  effect  of  delocalization  on
DID_Mng+MMng/Man we still note a negative but not significant outcome. The
outcome  changes  when  we  look  at  the  second  skill  variable,  i.e.
DID_MMng/Man,  in which,  at  the  numerator,  we identify the probably most
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skilled component of the workforce. When we allow the propensity score to use
the same non-treated observations more than once and we increase the maximal
allowed difference in the propensity score of treated and matched untreated, we
are  able to  find a  negative  and  statistically  significant  result.  This  means  that
offshoring firms face a decrease in the employment of skilled personnel, relative
to the unskilled.
Very similar results seem to emerge from Table 4, when we simply add
clerks at the denominator of both skill ratios. Again, offshoring does not seem to
particularly affect the difference over time of (DID_Mng+MMng/C+Man), i.e.
skilled non-manual over unskilled, both manual and non-manual). A significant
and negative effect, even if of small magnitude, emerges when looking at the ratio
between  (skilled)  middle  managers  and  (unskilled)  blue  collars  plus  clerks.
Manufacturing firms exposed to the offshoring treatment are more likely to suffer
a de-skilling re-composition of their workforce over time. 
We  finally  consider  the  dynamics  of  each  single  skill-occupational
category. In this case we observe the difference in the relative employment of top
managers,  middle  manages,  clerks  and  blue-collars  for  the  treated  and  the
counterfactuals. In line with previous results, Table 4 and Table 5 show that the
most significant  effect  of  production relocation is  on middle-managers,  with a
negative sign. 
We can interpret these results in two ways. On the one hand, the results
achieved seem to be in line with H1, according to which the defensive nature of
the offshoring  strategy  activates  a  sort  of  substitution effect  that  proves  to  be
detrimental for the upskilling dynamics of the workforce. In other words, the fact
of  de-locating  production  activities  towards  cheap-labor  countries  reduces  the
overall  scale  of  domestic  activity,  reducing  the  demand  for  managerial,
coordination and control  skills,  thus  decreasing the  relative  number  of  middle
managers for each operative. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  also  find  a  quantity  effect  on  the  relative
employment of skilled personnel. This result can be in line with hypothesis H2
and previous anecdotal evidence,  according to which Italian firms delocalizing,
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for instance, cheap-labor countries face an outflow of managerial skills because of
the need to coordinate and manage new, external units of production (Mariotti and
Mutinelli, 2005). It  is the case of a horizontal replication of domestic activities
that, on the one hand, can leave unchanged the domestic skill composition or, on
the  other  hand,  can  cause  the  transfer  of  managerial  skill  abroad  in  order  to
coordinate these new activities under the control of domestic affiliates.
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Table 3.  The skill composition effects of production offshoring in Italy, 1995-2003
 Outcome Variables 
 DID_NMan/Man DID_Mng+MMng/Man DID_MMng/Man
Algorithms Effect S.E.
Number of
delocalizing
firms off
common
support Effect S.E.
Number of
delocalizing
firms off
common
support Effect S.E.
Number of
delocalizing
firms off
common
support
NN
oversampling
2 -0.102 0.152 2 -0.018 0.045 2 -0.039 0.024 2
5 0.035 0.108 2 -0.016 0.040 2 -0.024 0.022 2
10 -0.000 0.095 2 -0.011 0.044 2 -0.022 0.025 2
NN  with
replacement
cal 0.01 -0.199 0.195 6 -0.024 0.060 6 -0.034 0.028 6
cal 0.02 -0.202 0.195 2 -0.014 0.056 2 -0.047*** 0.017 2
cal 0.05 -0.202 0.207 2 -0.014 0.061 2 -0.047** 0.020 2
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Table 4. The skill composition effects of production offshoring in Italy, 1995-2003
Outcome Variables
DID_ Mng+MMng/C+Man DID_MMng/C+Man Mng/Employment
Algorithms Effect S.E.
Number of
delocalizing
firms off
common
support Effect S.E.
Number of
delocalizing
firms off
common
support Effect S.E.
Number of
delocalizing
firms off
common
support
NN
oversampling
2 -0.009 0.039 2 -0.029** 0.014 2 0.018 0.028 2
5 -0.017 0.028 2 -0.025* 0.015 2 0.008 0.018 2
10 -0.008 0.034 2 -0.019 0.019 2 0.011 0.016 2
NN  with
replacement
cal 0.01 -0.012 0.056 6 -0.023 0.016 6 0.010 0.026 6
cal 0.02 -0.001 0.050 2 -0.033** 0.016 2 0.028 0.036 2
cal 0.05 -0.001 0.053 2 -0.033*** 0.012 2 0.028 0.039 2
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Table 5. The skill composition effects of production offshoring in Italy, 1995-2003
Outcome Variables
MMng/E Clerks/E Man/E
Algorithms Effect S.E.
Number of
delocalizing
firms off
common
support Effect S.E.
Number of
delocalizing
firms off
common
support Effect S.E.
Number of
delocalizing
firms off
common
support
NN
oversampling
2 -0.023** 0.011 2 -0.013 0.045 2 0.030 0.069 2
5 -0.018 0.011 2 -0.001 0.042 2 0.017 0.046 2
10 -0.015* 0.009 2 -0.000 0.038 2 0.012 0.036 2
NN  with
replacement
cal 0.01 -0.017 0.011 6 -0.05 0.058 6 0.044 0.076 6
cal 0.02 -0.026** 0.013 2 -0.043 0.058 2 0.046 0.093 2
cal 0.05 -0.026** 0.010 2 -0.043 0.060 2 0.046 0.080 2
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5. Concluding remarks
 
In this work we have assessed the existence of a delocalization effect on the skill
composition of the workforce.  We tested two hypotheses: first, that production
offshoring aimed at labor costs savings generates either a skill-upgrading effect or
a skill-downgrading effect; second, that the offshoring of production activities can
be a phenomenon of mere replication of domestic activities, thus causing either a
skill-biased effect or a general negative effect on the employment of skilled labor.
The  estimation  procedure  implemented   relies  on   the  so  called  DID-PSM
estimator, that, although grounded on identification assumptions, is not based on a
parametric specification and does not rely on optimization restrictions.              
The results obtained give the impression that the offshoring strategy of the
Italian  manufacturing  firms  does  not  exert  a  strong  impact  on  the  skill
composition  of  the  workforce.  The delocalization  strategy  appears  to  have  an
overall neutral effect on domestic occupational categories and on the skill ratios,
probably  confirming  an  idea  of  delocalization  as  a  horizontal  replication  of
domestic activities. Middle-managers appear to be the most affected category by
the offshoring decision. Such an evidence may find a twofold explanation. On the
one hand, skilled workers can decline more than unskilled workers because of a
substitution effect  that  is  driven  by  the  seek  of  economizing  on  labor  costs
reducing not only redundant activities, but also reducing the need for intermediate
skills such as control, managerial  and coordination for which middle-managers
are employed  for.  On the other hand, skilled workers  may decline in absolute
terms, because of a  quantity effect that can occur when firms decide to transfer
managerial  staff  in  order  to  coordinate  and  supervise  the  activities  replicated
abroad.                                                                                                               
However, due to the limited information available and the small number of
firms for the quasi-experiment, the interpretation and validation of these pieces of
evidence needs further research. 
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Appendix
Table A1-Variable definitions and summary statistics
VARIABLE DEFINITION MEAN STD.DEV. MIN MAX
Dependent variable of the first stage probit regression
d_deloc00 Dummy delocalization .048 .215 0 1
Control variables
Lnage Natural  logarithm  (2003-year  of
firm’s set-up) 3.402 .572 1.945 7.602
nw Liguria,  Lombardia,  Piemonte,
Valle d’Aosta .457 .498 0 1
ne Emilia-Romagna, Friuli Venezia-
Giulia,  Trentino  Alto-Adige,
Veneto
.300 .458 0 1
cen Abruzzo, Lazio, Marche, Molise,
Toscana, Umbria .160 .367 0 1
south Basilicata,  Calabria,  Campania,
Puglia, Sardegna, Sicilia .081 .274 0 1
suppldom Textiles,  footwear,  food  and
beverage,  paper  and  printing,
wood
.587 .492 0 1
specsupp Machinery and equipment, office
accounting  and  computer
machinery,  medical  optical  and
precision instruments
.412 .492 0 1
lsize Nat.  log  average  employment
size 1998-2000 4.147 1.097 2.335 8.542
breakup959
7
=1 if  the  firm  has  broken-up  at
31.12.1997; =0 otherwise .015 .122 0 1
breakup980
0
=1 if  the  firm  has  broken-up  at
31.12.2000; =0 otherwise .039 .194 0 1
group9507 = 1 if the firm belongs to a group
at 31.12.1997; =0 otherwise .227 .419 0 1
group9800 = 1 if the firm belongs to a group
at 31.12.2000; =0 otherwise .257 .437 0 1
Export and FDI
d_exp97 =1  if  the  firm  has  exported  in
1995-97; =0 otherwise 1.190 .393 0 1
d_exp00 =1  if  the  firm  has  exported  in
1998-2000; =0 otherwise .803 .398 0 1
d_fdi97 =1 if the firm has effected FDIs
in R&D in 1995-97; =0 otherwise .239 .427 0 1
d_fdi00 =1 if the firm has effected FDIs
in 1998-2000; =0 otherwise .018 .133 0 1
Technology
d_res97 =1  if  the  firm  has  invested  in
R&D in 1995-97; =0 otherwise 1.581 .494 0 1
d_res00 =1  if  the  firm  has  invested  in
R&D in 1998-2000; =0 otherwise .496 .500 0 1
Unit labor costs
lcla9597 Nat.  log.  labor  costs  per
employee 1995-97 3.453 .620 1.873 5.617
lcla9800 Nat.  log.  labor  costs  per
employee 1998-2000 3.297 .259 2.256 4.230
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Productivity
lfatta9597 Nat.  log.  sales  per  employee
1995-97 5.245 .760 3.536 7.395
lfatta9800 Nat.  log  sales  per  employee
1998-2000 3.444 .386 2.753 4.774
Capital intensity
litna9597 Nat.  log.  net  capital  assets  per
employee 1995-97 3.411 1.009 -.366 5.826
litna9800 Nat.  log.  net  capital  assets  per
employee 1998-2000 3.315 .875 -.274 5.443
Asset specificity and uncertainty
llev Debt/Asset ratio 1998-2000 -.493 .307 -2.082 -.025
un9800 Variance  of  the  annual
percentage  rate  of  variation  in
total sales, 1998-2000
.044 .282 0 5.038
lev_unc9800 Asset  Specificity  *  Volume
Uncertainty .018 .047 0 .341
Profitability
roi9800 Returns  on  investments  1998-
2000 .067 .056 -.119 .372
    
Table A2. Outcome variables* 
Outcome variables construction
DIDNonManuals/Manua
ls 
(DID_NMan/Man)
[(NonManuals/Manuals)03-(NonManuals/Manuals)00]-
[(NonManuals/Manuals)98-(NonManuals/Manuals)95]
DIDManagers+MidMan
s/Manuals 
(DID_Mng+MMng/Ma
n)
[(Managers+MidMans/Manual)03-( Managers+MidMans/ Manuals)
00] – [(Managers+MidMans/Manuals)98  -                  
( Managers+MidMans/Manuals)95]
DIDMidMans/Manuals 
(DID_MMng/Man)
[(MidMans/Manuals)03-( MidMans/Manuals)00]-
[(MidMans/Manuals)98-( MidMans/Manuals)95]
DIDManagers+MidMan
s/Clerks+Manuasl 
(DID_
Mng+MMng/C+Man)
[(Managers+MidMans/ Clerks+Manuals)03-
( Managers+MidMans/ Clerks+Manuals) 00] -
[(Managers+MidMans/ Clerks+Manuals)98  -
(Managers+MidMans/ Clerks+Manuals)95]
DIDMidMans/Clerks+M
anuasl 
(DID_MMng/C+Man)
[(MidMans/Clerks+Manuals)03-
( MidMans/Clerks+Manuals)00]- [(MidMans/Clerks+Manuals)98-
( MidMans/Clerks+Manuals)95]
DIDManagers/TotalEmp
loyees
(DID_ Men/E)
[(Managers/TotalEmployees)03-
( Managers/TotalEmployees) 00] - [(Managers/TotalEmployees)98  -
(Managers/TotalEmployees)95]
DIDMidMans/TotalEmp
loyees
(DID_ MMng/E)
[(MidMans/TotalEmployees)03-
( MidMans/TotalEmployees) 00] -[(MidMans/TotalEmployees)98  -
(MidMans/TotalEmployees)95]
DIDClerks/TotalEmploy
ees
(DID_ C/E)
[(Clerks/TotalEmployees)03- (Clerks/TotalEmployees) 00] -
[(Clerks/TotalEmployees)98-(Clerks/TotalEmployees)95]          
DIDManuals/TotalEmpl
oyees
[(Manuals/TotalEmployees)03- (Manuals/TotalEmployees) 00] -
34
(DID_ Man/E) [(Manuals/TotalEmployees)98-(Manuals/TotalEmployees)95]          
* Note: DID is the acronym Difference-In-Differences
Table A3.1. First-stage probit regression
Dependent variable:
d_deloc00 Coef. S.E. z
lnage 0.665** 0.287 2.32
nw -0.864 0.649 -1.33
ne -0.083 0.596 -0.14
cen -0.298 0.687 -0.43
lsize 0.098 0.190 0.52
specsupp 0.716* 0.379 1.89
group00 0.882* 0.473 1.86
breakup00 -0.554 0.758 -0.73
d_res00 -0.675* 0.391 -1.72
d_fdi00 2.044*** 0.767 2.66
group9597 -0.519 0.522 -0.99
d_res9597 -0.304 0.331 -0.92
d_fdi9597ue -0.384 0.407 -0.94
litna9800 0.235 0.293 0.8
roi9800 -1.991 3.330 -0.6
lnfatta~9800 2.159*** 0.818 2.64
lcla9800 -2.425** 0.993 -2.44
litna9597 -0.428 0.337 -1.27
roi9597 0.003 0.004 0.88
lfatta9597 -1.711** 0.821 -2.08
lcla9597 2.166** 0.859 2.52
constant -5.018* 2.607 -1.92
Log likelihood -46.022
Number of obs 321
LR chi2(21) 35.11
Prob > chi2 0.027  
Table A3.2. Description of the propensity score in the common support region
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 0.032 0.031  
5% 0.032 0.032  
10% 0.035 0.032 Obs 120
25% 0.047 0.032 Sum of Wgt. 120
 
 
50% 0.072 Mean 0.121
 Largest Std. Dev. 0.125
75% 0.126 0.444  
90% 0.252 0.537 Variance 0.015
95% 0.404 0.631 Skewness 2.675
99% 0.631 0.781 Kurtosis 11.407
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Table A3.3. Inferior bound, number of treated and number of controls in each block
Inferior dummy offshoring  
of block 1998-2000  
of pscore 0 1 total
 
 
0.0319967 91 9 100
0.2 9 4 13
0.4 4 1 5
0.6 0 2 2
 
 
Total 104 16 120
The final number of blocks is 4:
this number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score is not different for treated
and controls in each blocks
Notes: the output here reported is that one of the STATA module developed by Ichino and Becker
(2002).
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Figure A1 – Skill ratios trends in delocalizing and non-delocalizing firms on
common support
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Figure A2 – Occupational categories trends in delocalizing and non-
delocalizing firms common support
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